A nuclear site cannot have a "mostly safe" perimeter. RADI is being engineered to the standard where the answer to "did a drone approach?" is definitive, timestamped, cryptographically signed — and never in doubt.
A nuclear operator does not distinguish "hobbyist" from "hostile". Every entry into the exclusion zone is a mandatory reportable event. Design intent: 100% detect, 0% miss.
Nuclear containment structures are engineered against far worse — but the political and psychological effect of even a symbolic strike would be catastrophic. Design intent: intercept before impact.
Cooling-water infrastructure is the least-hardened part of any nuclear site. Design intent: sensor coverage extends into the maritime approach.
Drones carrying Wi-Fi survey rigs, mapping wireless attack surface for follow-on cyber operations. Design intent: RF-DF surfaces this signature at range.
Overlapping perimeter masts with redundant coverage. Every square metre seen by ≥ 2 sensors.
Dual-redundant appliances, active-standby, sub-second failover. Every track logged with regulatory-grade audit.
Qualified partner hard-kill layer, cued by HARAS, authorised by operator. Last-resort but always present.
Federation with the national IADS — every track visible to national air defence, in real time.
Design intent: every design decision — sensor placement, redundancy, ROE — traceable to a FANR / IAEA physical-protection recommendation. Nothing improvised.
Every RASAD detection, every HARAS classification, every DIRAA cue: hashed, chained, timestamped. The regulator can reconstruct any moment.
Design intent: mandatory real-time uplink to UAE MoD IADS on a certified interface. A nuclear site is a national asset — the picture belongs to the state.