In the Gulf, electricity is water. RADI is being engineered as the deterrence layer around the substations, desalination plants, and water works that keep a city habitable — where a drone-caused outage isn’t inconvenience, it’s casualty.
A small kinetic payload onto an in-service high-voltage transformer takes weeks to replace. A city block of 40 000 residents can drop in fifteen seconds.
A drone carrying contaminant sprayed at a desalination intake. Not the movies — a documented, planned threat vector. Design intent: coastal coverage as well as landside.
ISR runs profiling the switchyard, timing crew rotations, mapping where an operator would be during a real attack. The precursor pattern we intend to catch.
Small drones tasked to visually acquire SCADA console screens through control-room windows — a documented vector for follow-on cyber attack.
Substation perimeter masts + rooftop installations over control rooms and switchyards.
Fusion with the utility SOC — every drone track becomes a security event with full audit.
Directional soft-kill for gate + rooftop coverage, sited clear of GNSS-critical grid comms.
Multi-site federation across a utility’s N substations — one operator, one picture, one accountable log.
Design intent: RADI hardware coexists with IEC 61850 substation automation without interfering. No RF emission into GOOSE/SV subnets. No physical fouling of switchyard clearances.
Design intent: HARAS output compatible with UAE utility SOC formats. Every track becomes a security event of the type utility operators already handle.
HARAS being designed with dual-appliance active-standby, hitless firmware, and dual-fibre uplinks. The utility never sees the counter-drone system’s bad day.